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Doe v. Doe, 929 F.Supp. 608 (U.S. Dis. Ct. D. Connecticut, 1996)
and Brzonkala v. Vir2inia Polytechnic and State University,
935 F.Supp. 779 (U.S. Dis. Ct. W.D. Virginia, 1996)
by Beth Ann Ratchford
In recent decisions two federal district courts ruled on the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Remedy provision of the recently
enacted Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
This provision allows for victims of violence motivated by gender to
file a federal civil claim against their assailants. The Act defines a crime
motivated by gender as "an act or series of acts that would constitute a
felony" that is committed "because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." §
13981(d)(1). The Act thereby creates a new civil right to "be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender." § 13981. In enacting the
VAWA, Congress relied on its affirmative power under the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
In Doe v. Doe, the Connecticut District Court was asked to rule
on the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Remedy provision of the
VAWA in a motion to dismiss brought by the defendant. The Doe
court held that the remedy was a proper exercise of congressional
authority under the commerce power, that it did not encroach on the
police power of the states, and that it was reasonably adapted to deter
gender based violence.
The plaintiff in Doe sought damages from her abusive husband
for the severe physical and mental abuse she had suffered for more than
fifteen years. The defendant asserted that the Civil Rights Remedy was
unconstitutional because Congress lacked the authority to enact such a
remedy. In support of this argument, the defendant relied on the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct.
1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). In Logpez, the Court struck down the
Gun Free Zones Act, which applied to school zones, holding that the
government had failed to show a substantial connection between guns
in schools and interstate commerce. In Doe, the defendant argued not
only that the Civil Rights Remedy was similar to the Gun Free Zones
Act, but that Logpez had established a new, stricter test for determining
whether regulated activity "sufficiently affected" interstate commerce.
The Doe court rejected this analysis, instead finding that the
Supreme Court in Lop had reaffirmed the minimal rationality test for
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determining the affect of the regulated activity on interstate commerce.
What Lopez did do, the court reasoned, was to warn that the
Commerce Clause has limits and should not be extended to include
activities that have an 'indirect' or 'remote' affect on commerce.
Applying the rationality test, the court held that the "statistical, medical
and economic data before the Congress adequately demonstrated the
rational basis for Congress' findings that gender-based violence has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce." The court also rejected the
argument that the VAWA was an impermissible encroachment on state
power, holding that the recognition of a federal civil right has a distinct
societal function and does not infringe on traditional state police
powers.
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, the
court for the Western District of Virginia reached a very different
opinion. The Virginia court held that the plaintiff had a valid claim for
relief under the VAWA. However, relying on Lopez and the assertion
that Lppez created a stricter standard for reviewing non-economic
legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the court held the
Civil Rights Remedy provision of the VAWA unconstitutional.
Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic and State
University (VPI) was gang-raped in her dormitory room by two
football players. Several months after the rape, but before she filed a
formal complaint, one of the assailants announced publicly that "he
likes to get girls drunk and f--k the sh-t out of them." After she filed a
complaint with the university, a male athlete advised the other assailant
that he "should have killed that bitch." Brzonkala sought civil relief by
bringing a federal VAWA claim against VPI, the State Comptroller and
three football players, Antonio Morrison, James Crawford and Cornell
Brown. All actions except for those against Morrison and Crawford,
the two assailants, were dismissed. The defendants brought a motion
for dismissal, arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under the
VAWA and that the Act was unconstitutional in light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Loqpez.
The court held first that the gang-rape did constitute a crime
"motivated by gender animus." Looking at the facts, the court
reasoned that the assault indicated "a conspiracy of disrespect for that
woman." The factors weighed by the court included the short time she
knew the assailants, their failure to use condoms, the threatening and
disrespectful statements made during and after the assault and the
general characteristics of gang-rape. Unfortunately, in their reasoning
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the court upheld many popular myths about date rape, mainly that it is
less "egregious" than stranger rape and that it often involves a
"misunderstanding" or a situation "where a man's sexual passion
provokes the rape by decreasing the man's control."
Next, the court turned to the constitutionality of the Civil Right
Remedy provision of the VAWA. The Virginia court, in rejecting the
plaintiffs argument that the statute is constitutional because it
substantially affects interstate commerce, imposed a stricter test than
used by the Connecticut court in Doe. The Virginia court insisted that
under Lopez a stricter test is required when the regulated activity is not
economic in nature. Dismissing the Congressional findings that
violence against women affects commerce by keeping women from
employment and travel and increasing medical and other costs, the
court reasoned that the commerce power is based on the actual affect
on commerce and not "on Congress's perceived affect."
Concluding
that "showing that something affects the national economy does not
suffice to show that it has a substantial affect on interstate commerce,"
the court held the provision to be an impermissible use of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
Finally, the court turned to the validity of the provision under
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress, in
using the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for the legislation, stated
that it was enacted partly to remedy existing bias in the states' criminal
justice systems. The court held that there was insufficient causation
between the failure of the state to act and the action of the individual
perpetrator of violence against women. The court reasoned that "the
state action at issue (the inadequacies in the state criminal justice
systems) does not cause, or, in any significant manner, even contribute
to, the deprivation caused by the individual criminal." Concluding that
"there is no real possible complicity between the state criminal justice
system and private actors in VAWA actions," the court held that the
VAWA will not "remedy any legitimate Fourteenth Amendment
concern" and is therefore outside the parameters of Congressional
power.
The contrary results of these cases,.-decided within months of
each other, leave the future of the federal civil remedy for crimes
motivated by gender uncertain. The appeals courts needs to be closely
watched for a resolution of the conflicting holdings outlined in this
article.

